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Major health crises, historian David S. Jones recently reminded us “put pressure on the societies they strike”. And this
strain, he points out, “makes visible latent structures that might not otherwise be evident”. Something similar is
happening now. As the novel coronavirus pandemic quickly morphs into an unprecedented global calamity, issues that
not long ago seemed acceptable, fashionable, and even inescapable - such as fiscal austerity and science-scepticism, are
increasingly called into question. Unsurprisingly in an era dominated in many ways by ‘Big Tech’, the pandemic has
also helped to foreground how contestable – and, we argue, utterly frail – platform governance is. By this expression
we mean the regimes of rules, patterned practices and algorithmic systems whereby companies govern who can see
what in their digital platforms.
While all eyes are on public health, the larger economic wellbeing and other emergencies, platform governance is far
from being superfluous. In a moment where we all heavily depend on digital services to receive and impart news to
make sense of the current situation, the way companies such as Facebook and YouTube manage the content on their
platforms play an obvious role in how the very pandemic evolves. More than influencing the crisis, though, these
services have already been changed by it.
Sending moderators home: a sharp turn to AI in content moderation
Consider two recent developments.
As the outbreak escalated, Facebook and YouTube announced last week that decisions on whether to keep or take
down certain posts would rely less on human moderators (who would be sent home to avoid contamination) and more
on algorithmic systems. Increased automation, they admitted, would lead to more “mistakes” in the management of
content in the massive public spaces they privately control. Google (who owns YouTube) said on March 16 that “there
may be an increase in content classified for removal during this time”. Facebook sounded a little more defensive and
vague, when arguing on March 16 that “we may see some longer response times and make more mistakes as a result”
but that this shouldn’t “impact people using our platform in any noticeable way”.
Another move was made by Twitter. Responding to growing concerns over misleading content about the pandemic, the
platform announced in a corporate post on March 16 that it would adopt a draconian moderation policy in regards to
coronavirus-related posts. From then on, Twitter would request the removal of all “content that increases the chance
that someone contracts or transmits the virus. This apparently includes even tweets suggesting that “social distancing
is not effective”.
Even when taken at their face value, these changes should raise an eyebrow. While it is commendable to acknowledge
that automated content moderation might produce more “mistakes”, Google and Facebook’s announcements fall short
of explaining the various problems involved in the use of algorithmic systems to perform a task that reasonable
humans still mightily struggle to agree upon. To begin with, it is unclear what exact “mistakes” this automation will
produce. Facebook users quickly denounced that posts with legit information about the pandemic were taken down as
spam -- what the company called a mere “bug”.
As one of us argued in a recent co-authored paper in Big Data & Society, an almost fully automated system of content
moderation bears the dangers of hiding the political nature of decisions over content. What if these moderation
systems achieve their overarching aim by becoming an infrastructure that smoothly operates in the background, that is
taken for granted? Such infrastructures of public speech obscure their inner workings and the fundamentally political
nature of speech rules being executed by potentially unjust software at scale.
The politics of decisions over content in a pandemic crisis
Twitter’s decision on content related to the novel coronavirus, for example, seems to assume a level of conceptual
clarity and institutional legitimacy that simply do not exist. Making sense of evolving pandemics like this one is an
extraordinarily complex task, even for epidemiologists. For instance: some weeks ago, many experts were telling us
that social distancing should mainly apply to sick individuals, only to realise (after some research) that asymptomatic
people could also transmit the virus. If experts are unsure on what to do, why should we trust Twitter with the one-
sided ability to say which content can fuel the transmission of the virus?
Less than 24-hours after the new policy was announced, the platform gave us good reasons to be concerned. Elon
Musk, the powerful CEO of Tesla, who has repeatedly downplayed the seriousness of the pandemic, tweeted the false
information that “kids are essentially immune” to the new coronavirus. This might appear a blatant example of what
the platform had just forbidden. But the post was not removed. “It does not break our rules”, Twitter declared after
reviewing the “overall context and conclusion of the Tweet”.
Origins of frailness: concentrated production chains, unstable rules, unaccountable decisions
It is not the first time of course that Twitter appears to protect a powerful billionaire, as its seeming complacency with
Donald J. Trump’s behaviour suggests. Indeed, the particular issues that the current coronavirus crisis seem to
underscore point to a much more fundamental problem: companies’ content governance regimes depend on
remarkably frail arrangements.
This frailness is in part related to how concentrated content moderation “production chains” are. The current turn to
automation, for instance, is caused by the fact that many human moderators are not allowed to work from home. This
might seem surprising. Aren’t technology companies able to design safe systems for this kind of job to be done
remotely? As explained by Sarah T. Roberts, an UCLA (University of California, Los Angeles) assistant professor,
remote content moderation might be precluded by “constraints like privacy agreements and data protection policies in
various jurisdictions”. A disproportionate amount of the distressful labour that goes into moderation is exerted by
multitudes of low-paid individuals in poor countries. In fact, the current shortage of moderators appears to be directly
linked to the quarantine of a particular group of workers in Manilla, she says. “What is supposed to be a resilient just-
in-time chain of goods and services… may, in fact, be a much more fragile ecosystem in which some aspects of
manufacture, parts provision, and/or labor are reliant upon a single supplier, factory, or location.”
Another facet of platform governance’s frailness regards the instability of companies’ internal rules. Sudden and
reactive policy changes, like Twitter’s new coronavirus policy, are a constant. “When you look at a site’s published
content policies”, says a representative from a platform quoted in a book by Cornell University’s Tarleton Gillespie,
“there’s a good chance that each of them represents some situation that arose, was not covered by existing policy,
turned into a controversy, and resulted in a new policy afterward”.
Recently, we at the HIIG examined how 'Twitter Rules' (the platform’s community guideline) changed since 2009. Our
analysis found over 300 changes in directives, terminology and classification of regulations. Many of these shifts were
obviously associated with specific external events, such as the 2016 US presidential election and the ongoing ethnic
conflict in India. Others appeared to reveal the seemingly erratic ebbs and flows of a company unsure of how to exert
its enormous powers, e.g. the incremental complexification and then sudden simplification of “spam” definitions.
Overall, these changes seem to document Twitter’s slow and reluctant emergence as an explicitly political institution.
Finally, the suspicions triggered by the way in which Twitter apparently overruled its own policy not to punish Elon
Musk evokes platform governance’s perennial political fragility. That is, the lack of stable transparency channels
whereby the rest of society can minimally understand companies’ policymaking and technology design and
management. The decision-making of major social media platforms remains essentially unaccountable, often the
prerogative of a clique of executives and employees whose concerns, methods and (likely) disputes have been
essentially hidden from minimal public scrutiny1. While fiercely defended by companies as key to their business model,
this transparency deficit arguably weakens their legitimacy, increases external criticism and eventually leads these
companies to experiment with new governing practices. Facebook, for instance, now seems to be implementing its own
“Supreme Court”. Whether this initiative will flourish, and for how long, is unclear.
Platform governance after the novel coronavirus
Will such frailness resist? Can we expect platform governance to emerge from this pandemic as more reliable, stable
and democratic?
The frailness we described so far maintained a complex relationship to previous crises. Much of platform governance
regimes originated as adaptive reforms, hasty solutions to placate external criticism and instabilities. Take the unstable
internal policies and the escalation of content moderation with cheap human labour – largely done after the so-called
“techlash”. On the other hand, unaccountable decision-making has continually hindered our ability to understand the
extent to which companies could be indeed involved in recent watershed events. The use of platforms by Russia’s
disinformation agency during the 2016 US presidential election, for instance, was unveiled by journalists, academics
and judicial investigations. Companies like Facebook initially denied and deflected any criticisms.
The last years taught us that platforms are unlikely to truly enhance, on their own, governance regimes that, while frail,
are also profitable. They will have to be pressured. And this pressure will only be strong enough to promote any
structural change if platforms are shown to have played a part in the pandemic. What was the role that disinformation
circulating online played in the mushrooming of the cases? Did companies abate or worsen the problem? Should they
be indirectly involved in the death of dozens of thousands of people? It is likely that the magnitude of the trouble will
finally prove too high for companies to weather. It remains to be seen how the opacity of an increasingly automated
content moderation system may affect this assessment.
However, if this crisis ends up being a moment of further consolidation of Big Tech’s social power, as some predict,
their governance arrangements will probably go unchallenged for a long time. Or, perhaps worse, companies might use
this crisis to normalise money-saving solutions that in normal times would be ethically unacceptable – think of the
“mistakes” generated by the further turn to AI, peddled as the minor cost of grim trade-offs.
To say that shocks often work as catalysts of structural changes does not tell us the direction of the transformation.
There is no guarantee that any lasting change will be in the public interest. Policymakers, journalists and researchers
must redouble their accountability efforts. The governance regimes being renegotiated now are poised to be an even
more central structure in the world that will emerge from this cataclysm.
Footnotes
1. See however the recent pioneering study (PDF) of our colleagues Matthias C. Kettemann and Wolfgang Schulz on
Facebook’s private policy making.
